Policy Format
Envelope
Section titled “Envelope”schemaVersion: 2kind: Policymetadata: name: defaultspec: denyRead: [] denyModify: [] fsProfiles: {}Global Denies
Section titled “Global Denies”denyRead blocks reads. denyModify blocks writes. These rules accumulate globally and apply after the selected filesystem profile is resolved.
denyRead: - "**/*.env"denyModify: - .orbit/** - "**/*.env"Filesystem Profiles
Section titled “Filesystem Profiles”Profiles describe allowed read and modify globs.
fsProfiles: reviewer: read: [./**] modify: [] implementer: read: [./**] modify: - crates/** - docs/**An activity selects a profile with fsProfile.
spec: type: agent_loop fsProfile: implementerPlatform support. Spawned agent CLIs use a platform-specific OS boundary where supported: macOS uses
sandbox-exec, and Linux uses trusted/usr/bin/bwrapafter a namespace-and-mount capability probe. The Linux boundary enforces writes from the resolved profile while leaving host filesystem reads and host network access available; read rules and network-egress policy remain delegated. Linux dispatch fails closed when/usr/bin/bwrapis unavailable or the probe fails, unless the executor explicitly setsallow_fallback: true, which runs without Linux write confinement. On Windows and other unsupported platforms, the same policy YAML is applied to in-process FS-tool calls, but no OS-level backend wraps the agent subprocess.