Agents
Runtime Paths
Section titled “Runtime Paths”v1 ships CLI backends only. Orbit invokes coding agents by spawning their official CLIs (Codex, Claude Code, Gemini CLI, etc.) as supervised subprocesses under an FsProfile and policy guardrails. The agent CLI is responsible for talking to its provider; Orbit does not need a separate provider API key for the v1 path.
| Backend | v1 status | Role |
|---|---|---|
cli | Supported | Subprocess-backed provider CLIs. The only release-supported invocation path in v1. |
http | Preview / not in v1 release surface | Programmatic provider communication via LoopTransport. Wired in code and exercised in tests, but not covered by the v1 release contract. Slated to become primary in v2. |
backend: auto resolves before dispatch and folds to the configured default. Downstream execution always sees a concrete backend.
Providers
Section titled “Providers”Schema v2 provider values include:
claudecodexgeminiollamaopenai_compat
In v1 each provider runs through its CLI runtime under orbit-agent::providers/<name>/. HTTP transport support is provider-specific and not part of the v1 release surface; an HTTP attempt against an unwired provider fails structurally rather than silently falling back to CLI.
Tool Allowlists
Section titled “Tool Allowlists”Agent-loop activities declare the tool names an agent may call. Empty means no tools are allowed.
spec: type: agent_loop tools: - orbit.task.show - orbit.graph.searchon_denial controls whether a denied tool call terminates the loop or returns a structured error for the agent to handle. In v1 (CLI backend) the agent CLI executes inside a supervised subprocess; tool allowlist enforcement is delegated to the harness and recorded as a tool_allowlist.harness_delegated envelope event in the audit trail.
Platform Support
Section titled “Platform Support”Bundled agent executors (claude, codex, gemini) declare sandbox: macos-sandbox-exec, so the spawned subprocess is wrapped in macOS sandbox-exec with the activity’s resolved FsProfile compiled to SBPL. This OS-level isolation is macOS only. On Linux and Windows, EnvironmentHost::resolve_executor_sandbox rejects the platform mismatch — Orbit’s process supervision and tool allowlist still apply, but the agent subprocess itself runs without a kernel-level sandbox. The bundled local-shell executor has no sandbox declaration on any platform by design.